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Abstract: Thomas A. Sebeok’s name became all but synonymous with semiotics
during the last half of the twentieth century. Sebeok located neglected semioti-
cians in antiquity, and convinced many contemporary scholars that they were
semioticians. One of his most fruitful encounters was with Juri Lotman of the
Tartu–Moscow School of Semiotics, who had published in 1967 an ambitious
model of human sign systems in which language would constitute a primary
modeling system, and cultural phenomena a secondary modeling system. We
inspect how Sebeok amended Lotman’s system, inserting another primary
modeling system before language. This brings biological precursors to human
language as a syntactic and learned faculty that builds on many nonsyntactic and
sometimes nonconscious senses, including emotion, affect, and memory. We note
how, in Sebeok’s final book in 2000 onmodeling systems theory, co-authoredwith
Marcel Danesi, there is a suggestion that the three layers of modeling systemsmay
be colored by Peircean notions of firstness, secondness, and thirdness; we clarify
how these layers are analogue. Finally, the fundamentals of the primary modeling
system leak into languaging, as better understood through post-Sebeok cognitive
and neurological sciences, and rendering less mysterious some of the strange
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic’s proxemics crisis.
Keywords: analogue communications; modeling systems theory; Peircean phe-
nomenology; primary modeling system; systems thinking
1 Semiotics’ King Midas
Very seldom will a classic and already sophisticated field of study be adopted and
transformed by a single scholar, as happened in the case of semiotics upon the
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embrace by Thomas A. Sebeok (1920–2001). Sebeok’s devotion to semiotics
commenced in his youth, and his domination in the field dates from the early
1960s, continuing up to his death in 2001. In 2000, he published his final book of
theoretical and pragmatic substance, with Marcel Danesi: The forms of meaning:
Modeling systems theory and semiotic analysis (Sebeok and Danesi 2000).
That millennium year, Sebeok attended what would be his final visit to the
essentially international organization he had forged 25 years earlier (of coursewith
colleagues, including John Deely), the perhaps poorly labeled Semiotic Society of
America. The theme of the 2000 conference, aptly minted by Deely, was “Sebeok’s
Century.” Deely also attended that conference, held on 28 September to 1 October
2000 at Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana, and he very probably
recorded Sebeok’s keynote address, “The King of Lydia, the Thane of Cawdor, and
the Emperor of Ice-Cream.”1 For untallied decades, Deely had made a point of
taping Sebeok, and perhaps only Sebeok, realizing that history was continuously
being unveiled.2
Looking back, however, what a surprise it still is that Sebeok did not speak to
that recent book on modeling, published 16 February 2000, and/or about bio-
semiotics, another field of study Sebeok successfully launched through his energy,
enthusiasm, and transdisciplinary contacts, or/and about any of the other semiotic
realms he had established himself or inseminated through other minds, globally,
in his role as midwife. Instead, as noted by Paul Cobley: “That Sebeok could
confound not only his critics but also his most committed colleagues and admirers
is one small clue to his ability to stay at least one step ahead of the intellectual
game” (Cobley 2003: 474) towax instead, not on cabbages andkings, but on a king,
a thane, and an emperor. As his audiences, interlocutors, and readers had by then
witnessed, all of Sebeok’s ventures turned to gold: he ruled as semiotics’ own King
Midas, as noted in one of his obituaries (cf. Anderson 2003).
We two among Sebeok’s numerous mentees now stage an autopsy, as it were,
on that 2000 modeling volume. We experienced Sebeok in overlapping times
(Anderson from 1983,3 Cannizzaro from 20044), but seldom in overlapping places.
We ourselves have also been separated by generation and geography, but joined in
our saturation with Sebeok’s global semiotics. This semiotics subsumes all its
flavors in a life of the mind – above, below, and beyond the overdrawn twins of
1 Posthumously published (Sebeok 2008 [2000]).
2 These sound tapes of Sebeok’s talks, recorded by Deely, may be in Deely’s archives at Saint
Vincent College, Latrobe, Pennsylvania 15650, USA.
3 Culminating in a position paper (Anderson et al. 1984).
4 Reflected in both undergrad dissertation (Cannizzaro 2005) and PhD dissertation (Cannizzaro
2012).
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humanities and science; models andmodeling pertain to all of the above vantages
as indicated in the book’s subtitle,Modeling systems theory and semiotic analysis,
here,MST.We startwith definitions, even though, as it clearly states onAnderson’s
office door: “Nothing interesting can be defined; everything is interesting.”
2 Model, modeling, modeler, modelee
Turning to Sebeok and Danesi (2000), the term model – like any compelling
notion –defies formal definition, not only because it is interesting, but because
such a definition would depend on the structure, the history, the function, and the
types of uses that the model might have. For instance, there are retrospective
descriptive models “of” and prospective generative models “for,” the latter having
some utility for either understanding or construction or both. No model can afford
equal weight to all parts, constituents, angles, or purposes.
The uses of any model could be multifarious, because “models serve many
functions in human life. They allow people to recognize patterns in things; they act
as predictive guides or plans for taking actions. They serve as exemplars of specific
kinds of phenomena” (Sebeok andDanesi 2000: 2). In itsmost general state, amodel
is a form, often visualized, that has beenexternalized through someusually physical
medium to stand for referents (or for a class of referents), such as objects, events,
feelings (Sebeok and Danesi 2000: 2). In other words, a model can be generally
understood in relation to its capacity to refer to something other than itself, also
known as referential capacity. An example would be the map of London’s subway
(the “Tube,” as the Londoners call it), which is a simplified model of the real dis-
tances and actual positioning of underground stations on a standard citymap. Such
a model’s value lies in the shorthand way of approaching the shape of the territory,
and the value it affords travelers wishing to plan a journey. Of course, a map of the
map is not the territory, nor is a map the territory either (the latter reminder attrib-
uted to Alfred Korzybski (1879–1950) (Korzybski 1994 [1933]: 58).
According to Sebeok and Danesi, the study of models goes hand-in-hand with
the study of their functions or use within the ecologies that generate and differ-
entially maintain their relations. They state: “The key concept in semiotics is, in
fact, that no single form can bear meaning unless it enters into systematic con-
nections with other forms” (Sebeok and Danesi 2000: 14). We would emphasize
that meaning can only emerge along with its contexts, symbiotically as figure and
ground.
In introducingmodels andmodeling, Sebeok andDanesi occasionally point to
“function,” “adaptation,” and “survival.” These notions were commonplace at the
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time of their writing, but now call for nuancing, as they can carry baggage from the
just-so logics leaking from positivism that thrive still in many discourse commu-
nities. Some of these discourse communities seem saturated with conservative
religious beliefs as well, wherein everything “must have a reason.” Functionalism
and adaptationism are consonant with such beliefs, and fuel much of the critique
in post-Darwinian biological science (cf. Cowles 2020; Gould 2002; Reynolds 2020).
That Sebeok anticipated those reservations is evident in the particular scientists,
social scientists, and philosophers whom he drew into biosemiotics, these
including Jesper Hoffmeyer, Claus Emmeche, Kalevi Kull, Terrence Deacon, Søren
Brier, John Deely, and others collected into the anthology by Favareau (2010).
Another and often unstated feature of models is that they differ from their
source inspirations primarily in terms of the most emphatic attributes being
modeled! Such attributes can be as fundamental as space or time, which are
simplified in service of the totalizing task of modeling (cf. Foley 1991). The map of
the London underground, for instance, bears no fidelity to space, or even to re-
lations within space, such as angles along the route. Likewise, the stereotype
model of an angry woman as a “nag” foregrounds certain features – the act of
venting anger – but not the context of patriarchy within which this cultural model
is situated. That is, themodel of “nag” does not capture that venting anger is an act
of self-defense, can subsume fear or sadness, and can also constitute an attempt at
rebellion; by excluding all these nuances, this stereotype model deems women’s
anger as unacceptable and denigrates it. More profoundly, in biomedical research,
a major epiphany in recent decades centers on its reliance on animal models, such
as mice in experiments being stand-ins for a different species, often ours, Homo
sapiens, and, it must be added, using human males as models for the species as a
whole.
The actual process of generating forms is called modeling. This exposes some
often obscured relations. In English, model is a verb as well as a noun, but as a
noun it may pertain to either the source inspiration or the target medium. Our
models are ofmodels, and, as Stephen JayGouldmight say, it’s “models all theway
down.” Gould (1987) referred to cosmological explanations of some of the deepest
of temporal processes. In some folk myths, the knownworld sits upon a turtle, and
that turtle upon another turtle, and so on, hence, turtles all the way down. In
evolutionary theory, Gould’s domain, phylogenetic time has been illustrated by
tree diagrams, or upside-down roots, often read by following time upwards as the
branches proliferate, although the diagrams are equally legible when read from
the top down. As everyone learnsmore frompaleontology, genetics, and biological
processes, Gould (1987) asserted that the tree image must be replaced with a bush,
themodel then becoming “bushes all theway down” (or up!)– the actual title of his
1987 article.
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Modeling, the gerund form of the verb, while capturing some of the dynamics
of process, behaves as a noun, suggesting something that might be set into motion
by other processes, or by an agent, a modeler. The modeled, which would be an
existing actual or imagined phenomenon, once conceptualized itself as a model,
might be designated themodelee, were themodeled something like a person (but it
seldom is), and modelee is not accepted in playing Scrabble! In the creative arts,
the modeled human is called a model, and the result of the modeling becomes a
portrait, or a sculpture, or some other genre of representation – and a model too.
Google’s Book Ngram viewer registers the incidence of the word model taking off
with World War II, and peaking around 1990, slacking off somewhat thereafter
until 2010.Modeling andmodeler onlymodestly arise in this database around 1965
and, indistinguishable, very soon level off; the incidence formodelee is decidedly
minuscule.
Current English discourse, and particularly academic prose, rely heavily
on nouns, at the expense of revealing process (cf. Durst-Andersen 2011;
Durst-Andersen 2018). Durst-Andersen’s linguistic ontological supertypes, sug-
gesting that English is a hearer-oriented language (distinguishing this from, for
instance, the speaker-oriented Spanish and the context-oriented Russian, all these
in the Indo-European family), was not available to Sebeok and Danesi, but may be
inserted in this discussion from time to time.Model as a noun takes a verb to ignite
a process, since temporal dynamics requiremore effort to express in English, while
the language asserts facts very easily. When more research has been done on the
cognitive implications of Durst-Andersen’s three communication supertypes
(hearer-oriented, speaker-oriented, context-oriented), which are found across all
language families, we will be better able to compare and contrast both human
behavior and the inferential habits of science in designating and dealing with
evidence, across both languages and cultures. Philosophers of science and sci-
entific practitioners have already documented cultural patterns that may or may
not be consonant with Durst-Andersen’s more recent research (cf. Bolton 2015;
Conrad 2019; Cowles 2020; Danchin 2018; Danchin et al. 2018).
3 Tartu–Moscow School semiotic modeling
systems
While modeling has been integral to sciencing from ancient time, according to
Sebeok (1991b [1988]: 35), the notion of semioticmodeling owes much to the Tartu–
Moscow School’s notion of modeling system (Lotman 1967, 1990; Zaliznjak et al.
1977). In Tartu–Moscow semiotics, the notion of semiotic modeling is “the structure
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of elements and of rules for combining them that is in a state of fixed analogy to the
entire sphere of an object of knowledge” (Lotman 1967 cited in Sebeok 1991b [1988]:
50). The school focused on the totality of culture (Broms andKaufmann 1988), since,
as Lotman put it, the smallest functioning mechanism of culture is not the separate
language but thewhole semiotic space, even semiosphere, of the culture in question
(Lotman 2001: 125).
Thus, through a spatial and material conception of culture as entailed in his
notion of semiosphere, Lotman demonstrates his concern with institutions in
general and organizations in particular, as systems, particularly in relation to both
structure and time. With such an emphasis on structural understanding and broad
applicability, semiotic modeling is the quintessence of generalism or systems
thinking (more on this below). Unsurprisingly then, “semiotic modeling” and
“systems” become married in the expression modeling system.
In 1967, Juri Lotman, the Russian semiotician spending his professional career
at the University of Tartu, Estonia, provided a classic formulation of semiotic
modeling systems, defining them as:
[…] the structure of elements and of rules for combining them that is in a state of fixed analogy
to the entire sphere of an object of knowledge […] Systems that have a natural language as
their basis and that acquire supplementary superstructures, thus creating languages of a
second level, can appropriately be called secondary modeling system. (Lotman 1967, cited in
Sebeok 1991b [1988]: 50)
The term modeling system in contemporary viewpoints will not be a general
replacement term for semiotics, but rather it hints at a precise conception of se-
miotics that mediates a synchronic approach (typical of Saussurean semiology)
and a diachronic approach (typical of pre-Saussurean linguistics), giving equal
weight to both structural and historical considerations. The historical elementmay
be descriptive or also functional. The modeling system precisely illustrates the
derivational character of culture in relation to natural language. Natural language
here ordinarily refers to human habits of externalized speech and sign, and con-
trasts with artificially constructed language and so-called computer language. The
Tartu–Moscow School’s use of natural language sometimes appears bothmore and
less restrictive, however, including institutions and products of culture such as art.
With the sometimes-called Soviet5 view, linguistic systems precede religious
systems and other cultural institutions (Zaliznjak et al. 1977, 47). In Soviet
5 The use of the term “Soviet” could prove problematic today given the negative ideological
connotation that it may attach to semiotics. However there is a book titled Soviet semiotics (Lucid
1977), and Sebeok himself uses this expression a number of times to refer to the Tartu andMoscow
school, e.g. “Soviet semiotics of the Tartu–Moscow school” (1988: 49) and “Soviet conceptions of
models” (Sebeok 1991b: 53).
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semiotics: An anthology, Lotman states that poetic language and natural
language are particular manifestations of more general systems that are in
continuous tension and mutual translation, while at the same time not being
fully translatable (1977: 98). This distinction is specific to the work of Russian
semioticians A. A. Zaliznjak, V. V. Ivanov, and V. N. Toporov, as well as that of
Juri Lotman, who eventually taught semiotics in Tartu from 1954 until his death in
1993.
Nontranslatability at this juncture refers to entire conceptual regimes, not
just a few linguistic tokens, eventually leading to conceptual metaphor theory,
not just metaphors (Danesi 2013). Beyond semiotics, similar ideas were not so
ambitious, where nontranslatability pertained to key metaphors, not intuited
conceptual or blended metaphors (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 2003 [1980]), let alone
social systems. But even at that smaller scale, whenever the ethnographer or
translator encounters an opaque word or behavior, or a “rich point” (Agar 1994:
60), it’s bound to be enlightening beyond the bounds of that word or behavior
(cf. Ortner 1973).
According to Zaliznjak et al., there must be a natural language to be found at
the basis of all other sign systems – not restricted to the naturally learned language
that today is usually termed natural language. This Soviet notion of natural lan-
guage consists in oral or/andwritten language – including the pictorial, ormusical
or vocal phrases, and even gesture and forms of human behavior like sleep,
hypnosis, and ecstasy (1977: 49). This means that the primary modeling system in
Tartu–Moscow semiotics may indeed include, besides spoken language, also sign
language, a bona fide natural language, plus many external behaviors that would
not be syntactic forms. However, Sebeok himself would not be using language to
apply to any forms of expression or communication that were not both naturally
learned and syntactic.
The Soviet notion of natural language would share, with other cultural systems,
general features such as the possibility of articulating a sequence of elements
belonging to that paradigmatic system, and other paradigmatic (largely spatial) re-
lations, as well as syntagmatic (largely temporal) relations (Zaliznjak et al. 1977: 49).
Notably, what post-Sebeok we would refer to as nonverbal communication, the
Soviet semioticians would consider a text – this not limited to anything in a written
language. For example, Pjatigorskij and Uspenskij state how the study of human
personality can be based on analyzing “a text of behavior” (1977: 137). Thus, in
Tartu–Moscow semiotics, linguistic systems were considered as universal sign sys-
tems constituting cultural superstructures.
The functioning of primary and secondary modeling systems in Tartu–
Moscow semiotics is explained in Juri Lotman’s work on the semiosphere (Lotman
1967, 2001 [1990]). The semiosphere is a model of culture comprising both center
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and periphery, the locations of the primary modeling system and secondary
modeling system, respectively. Lotman presents the primary modeling system as
verbality (as in the tautology, verbal language), as well as pictorial representa-
tions, presumably of ideas supported by vision. In regard to analyzing pictorial
texts, which he refers to as “iconic rhetoric,” Lotman says “the semiotic and
conventional principle which lies at the heart of every semiotic fact has to be
exposed, and the text, which is perceived by the naïve consciousness without its
conventionality, must be recognized for what it is. In practical terms this means
that at this stage, features inherent to a verbal text are ascribed to the non-verbal
text” (Lotman 2001: 555).
The secondary modeling system would be instantiated in cultures and
conventional sign systems at the level of institutions such as kinship, eco-
nomics, law, religion. In the semiosphere, one can observe the derivational
character of culture (Lotman’s secondary modeling system), with respect to
verbal language (Lotman’s primary modeling system) serving as a model of
continuity among systems of different supposed complexity (as imagined be-
tween alloanimal6 and human). Thus far, no semiotic modeling presumes to
embrace the balance of the macroscopic and microscopic biomes, whether
combined or not, excepting that of Sebeok, and his repeatedly (cf. Sebeok
2001b: 14–15; Sebeok and Danesi 2000: 158).
Semiotic modeling in general has been further explored by Sebeok himself
(1991a, 1991b [1988], 1991c), Anderson and Merrell (1991), Krampen (1997), Sebeok
and Danesi (2000), Danesi (2013, 2014), Cobley (2010), Kull (1998, 2010), Coletta
(2015), Hoffmeyer (1996), Brier (2008), and Cannizzaro (2014). At the twenty-fifth
Symposium of the Tartu–Moscow School of Semiotics (Imatra, Finland, 27–29 July
1987), Sebeok proposed a reconfiguration (1988)7 of the notion of primary
modeling system developed in Tartu–Moscow semiotics, and in Lotman’s
semiosphere.
6 Sebeok and Deely were both first exposed to the term, alloanimal (cf. Count 1973), referring to
animals other than humans, in 1983, at the Fourth International Summer Institute for Semiotic and
Structural Studies, at Sebeok’s Research Center for Language and Semiotic Studies, Indiana
University, Bloomington, Indiana. Deely first used the term in Deely (2017), posthumously, while
Sebeok may never have done so. Sebeok’s RCLSS was so re-named in 1975, taking over from his
earlier Research Center for Anthropology, Folklore, and Linguistics, created in 1956.
7 The reworking of the Tartu–Moscow school’s notion of the primary modeling system was
originally proposed by Sebeok during the Symposium and then published in the conference
proceedings volume edited by Henri Broms and Rebecca Kaufmann (1988).
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4 Sebeok’s reconfiguration of “language as
modeling”
In 1991, Sebeok published two different articles with the same title: “In what sense
is language a primary modeling system?” (1991a, 1991b). The first, dating from
1988, Sebeok included in his 1991 volume, A sign is just a sign (1991a). The second
was published in On semiotic modeling (Anderson and Merrell 1991). This chapter
was the transcription, by John Deely, of a thus far unspecified address by Sebeok,
made available through Deely’s previously mentioned habit of audio-taping
Sebeok’s formal addresses and informal lectures. Sebeok authorized this tran-
scription, with his edits, as he did not have time to contribute awrittenmanuscript.
Here, Sebeok explains that he had occasion to confirm his understanding of the
Tartu–Moscow School semiotic modeling systems with Ivanov in Tartu in August
1970, while he was in Tartu for a lecture. That understanding he published in 1974
(cited through Sebeok 1985: 23, fn. 38). Sebeok emphasized the fundamental
contribution that Soviet scholars brought to semiotics with their emphasis on
modeling, this making imperative concepts of space, history, and innovation
through translation, and foregrounding the derivational character of culture in
relation to verbal language. Yet Sebeok suggested that Soviet semiotics8 did not
sufficiently take into account our species’ evolutionary history, that is, how
humans could communicate and generate cultures, presumably before mastering
externalized verbal signs, gesture through vision, and vocality through audition.
He observed that verbal language “is the modeling system the Soviet scholars call
primary but which, in truth, is phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically sec-
ondary to the nonverbal” (1991b: 55). Sebeok confirms that the Soviet conceptions
of modeling systems were influenced by biologist Jakob von Uexküll’s theory of
meaning and Umwelt (1982 [1940]).
By the time Sebeok came to reconfigure the two Tartu–Moscow modeling
systems into three, he had already expanded semiotics to include biosemiotics.
Implicit in semiotics, and explicit in biosemiotics, it is recognized that any concept
entails relations-cum-contexts, and those relations likewise have relations,
although we needn’t pursue any beyond a pragmatic horizon. A powerful model
from von Uexküll, which he himself also applied beyond biology, is the notion of
Umwelt (Uexküll 2001 [1937]). The term, from German, has been in the process of
being naturalized in the English language ever since Sebeok rediscovered and
promoted the term (cf. Deely 2004; Sebeok in Uexküll 1982 [1940]). At this time,
many writers in English are declining Umwelt as a proper German word, but pre-
dictably, once fully naturalized in English, it will be neither capitalized, nor ita-
licized, nor declined; here we will decline to decline it, for simplicity’s sake.
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Furthermore, von Uexküll’s Innenwelt (Uexküll 1982 [1940]: 10–11) comprises
thosemodels that can be located to individuals of a species (of animals); somewill
code for approach andwithdraw, others bemore elaborate, and somenodoubtwill
still be discovered. Then, as now, communication from the Umwelt and hence
available to any creature arrives to the Innenwelt through senses that are analogues
or homologues of our sensorium of touch, smell, taste, vision, hearing, and any
number of sixth senses (cf. Howes 2009). These senses shape what individuals can
notice, or passively receive, as incidental or premeditated communication from
conspecifics or others in the Umwelt. Still other pathways have developed for the
execution of communication, including vocal calls and bodily gesture, but none so
far have exhibited the syntactic structures of natural human language. As to the
Umwelt, we can imagine any organism’s Umwelt, for example, but Innenwelt
cannot be so obviously localized in a central, and cognitive, nervous system, other
than provisionally for animals. Indeed, the models of Innenwelt and Umwelt have
not been nuanced for plants, fungi, protista, and monera, the other kingdoms in
Lynn Margulis’s taxa that Sebeok introduced to semiotics in 1983 (cf. Anderson
et al. 1984).
Through a phylogeny, that is, modeling, Sebeok reminded both scientists and
humanists how hominids (including various species in the genus Homo, such as
Homo habilis, Homo erectus, Homo neanderthalensis) (cf. Schwartz and Tattersall
2015), and evenmore, would have relied onmultimodal nonverbal communication
while externalized syntax-based linear language was developing. Verbal lan-
guage, both gestural and then spoken, likely emerged in concert with culture in
H. sapiens by 200,000 years ago. The faculty of verbal display (either in gesture or
speech) depended on a capacity for syntax that would allow, for example,
communication facilitating manufacture of tools with standardized techniques
(though the habit of certain types of stone to break reliably in flakes is another
factor allowing such techniques), but not yet to externalize and articulate linear
speech (1991c [1988]: 55); hence, considering the phylogeny of communication of
the genus Homo, Sebeok assumed that internalized and externalized nonsyntactic
sign systems would have been antecedent to the externalized sign system that we
now call linguistic. Earlier humans and related animals, particularly mammals,
then and now, rely on vocal calls and “songs,” as well as the faculties of the other
less controllable sense and expressive-related organs.
Nonsyntactic passive and then both passive and active communication is
common to all living things (including animals, plants, fungi, protista, and
monera) (Sebeok 1991b). Sebeok pointed to the earliest form of inter-organismic
communication in our biosphere to be found in bacteria (Sebeok 2001b: 14–15). He
also assumed that semiotic modeling systems would pertain to nonanimals, but
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only in general. Following Hewes (1973), Sebeok accepted that nonvocal gestural
language preceded vocal spoken language, both being verbal, that is, syntactic,
and in today’s terminology, both would qualify as natural language.
Note, the term nonverbal has become only more confusing since Sebeok’s day;
he himself referred to Bullowa’s (1979: 9–10) coinage of extraverbal (cf. Sebeok
1991c: 335). Nonsyntactic communication as nonverbal or extraverbal also in-
volves other communication taking place within an organism – these would
include biological codes such as the genetic, metabolic, and immune systems and
so on – or taking place between conspecifics or between dissimilar organisms or
groups or assemblages of them. An example of the most expansive of such
communication would be the different elements and relations in an ecosystem, as
for example hypothesized by Lovelock in his Gaia hypothesis (1979).
For Sebeok, the nonsyntactic modalities are the repositories of actual pre-
conscious and conscious feeling, emotion, affect, memory, engram that constitute
the fundamental modeling that plays into a species’ (or creature’s) habitual
behavior. In fact, Sebeok holds that “[Natural] [l]anguage evolved as an adapta-
tion; whereas speech developed out of language as a derivative exaptation” (1991b
[1988]: 56). It is likely, however, that adaptation is not the sole explanation of
deeper-structure language, either, but surface-level sign and vocal language,
languaging, remains an excellent example of Gould and Vrba’s (1982)
“exaptation.”
In the terminology emerging at the time, Sebeok declared that only hominids
possess two mutually sustaining repertoires of signs: zoosemiotic nonverbal, thus
nonsyntactic, versus anthroposemiotic verbal and syntactic (1991b: 55) – whether
vocal or nonvocal. All living organisms in fact communicate exclusively through
nonverbal means, with the sole exception of some members of the species H. sa-
piens, who communicate by both nonverbal and verbal means. Evidence of syntax
among alloanimals remains a tantalizing possibility for some researchers, for
instance with dolphins and other sea mammals.
Today, the nonverbal/extraverbal versus the verbal can more usefully be
referred to as nonsyntactic and syntactic, respectively. Syntax is exclusive to hu-
man language, although semioticians may detect it elsewhere, as in culture;
syntax consists in the system that governs the hierarchic structure of speech or
signed language, those externalized communicative faculties we might also call
languaging. Languaging is not a term we find in Sebeok, but other semioticians
have found it useful (cf. Halliday 1975; Maturana and Varela 1980; Swain 1985).
One reason for the increasing utility of the term languaging is that it subsumes both
vocal and nonvocal (sign) verbal language.
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The Tartu–Moscow natural language in their primary modeling system is not
human natural language as verbally encoded, but rather inclusive of non-
deliberate leaking and deliberate indicating of sensorial information manifest in
chemical, thermal, olfactory, acoustic, haptic, balance, and visual forms. In
humans, such primary modeling existed, phylogenetically, alongside the cogni-
tive capacity manifest in the production of externalized verbal signs (now
becoming Sebeok’s secondary modeling system). However, it was not until H. sa-
piens that such verbal signs (secondary modeling systems) were routinely circu-
lated, eventually or concomitantly consolidating as culture in Sebeok’s tertiary
modeling system.
To recapitulate, Sebeokhas reconfigured the natural language expression from
Tartu–Moscow semiotics’ primarymodeling system, effectively splitting it in two –
the nonsyntactic, evolutionary capacity for modeling, and the syntactic, exaptive
capacity for communication. Also, it is worth noting that at the time of his writing,
science was resistant to the folk knowledge that, in alloanimals as well as in other
living things, not everything was functional, to be explained through natural se-
lection. Indeed, (excessive) functionalism, also labeled the adaptationist program
in evolutionary theory, continued for some time in biology after Gould and Eld-
gredge’s introduction of the distinction between saltational reorganization in
punctuated equilibrium, and strictly gradual change via natural selection, muta-
tion, gene flow, and genetic drift (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Gould and Eldredge
1977; Gould and Lewontin 1979; cf. Pittendrigh 1958).
The exaptive, message-swapping function of communication can be intended
as non-essential communication, which abounds in culture. A further distinction
becoming more valuable is that between natural selection so evident in biology,
mostly selection-out, versus artificial selection that dominates in culture, pre-
dominately selection-in. In general, biology proscribes, culture prescribes. Bio-
logical natural selection cannot come close to the mantra of “survival of the
fittest,” for many reasons; if one needs to boil it down, it would be the teleological
expression of “survival of the not terminally unfit,” while the terminally unfit and
the unluckywould be culled, proscribed from remaining in the gene pool. Oneway
or the other, however, biology self-corrects, or not, supporting not the fittest or
even the fitter, but the fit enough to have threaded through the accidents and
necessitiesMonod described as evolution (Monod 1972 [1970]). In contrast, cultural
artificial selection routinely accumulates marginal, perhaps fashionable, traits
and habits that can even be clearly deleterious; these may not be continually
trimmed by the selection-out associatedwith natural selection and thus can lead to
larger perturbations.
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5 Levels in MST: primary, secondary, tertiary
Whether stirring up deleterious systemic perturbations or not, phylogenesis,
selection, evolution, and development are key features of semiotic modeling
systems. Modeling systems theory inherits from Lotman and Tartu–Moscow
semiotics a strong evolutionary, derivational component. The fundamental
recognition that there is a form of modeling faculty, the primary modeling systems
(PMS), phylogenetically and ontogenetically antecedent to the externalization of
syntactic signs – these now being secondarymodeling systems (SMS) – constitutes
the basis for Sebeok and Danesi’s Forms of meaning: Modeling systems theory
(2000) (MST). It follows that the Tartu–Moscow secondary modeling system
becomes the tertiarymodeling system (TMS), accommodating cultural and societal
extensions of language and languaging. The deeper facilitating faculties of
language interlock with those of culture, as both may materialize in external
behavior, both in sign and speech, and in society.
The derivational character or extensionality principle, as Sebeok and Danesi
call it, is also what most lucidly illustrates their evolutionary concept of modeling.
Echoing Sebeok and Danesi (2000: 1), Coletta (2015: C.951) underlines how semi-
otic modeling is derivative of semiosis to produce forms to represent objects,
events. Thus semiotic modeling would be virtually synonymous with semiosis.
According to theMSTperspective,whatwe generally call “semioticmodeling”may
be understood to obtain, to manifest itself, in four developmentally arranged
registers, only one of which is itself formally called “modeling”: these are
“perception” “semiosis”, “modeling,” and “representation.”
Sebeok states that perception refers to sensory knowing of the natural world
surrounding the living subject. Semiosis is the biological capability of recog-
nizing forms, while modeling, a derivative of semiosis, is the actual activity of
producing forms. Representation, a unique capacity of the Homo species that
develops in childhood, consists in referring to the world in terms of singularized,
composite, cohesive, and connective forms. Each of these cognitive steps is de-
rivative, one of the other, and, like the modeling systems, must partake of
extensionality. There persists a number of origin stories for the emergence of,
first, internal language, and later and evolutionarily separately, that of exter-
nalized languaging. This resonates with Deacon’s (1997) explanation of how
language emerges from hominids’ sociality, leading to larger-scale social in-
teractions, rather than from disembodied genetic mutations and the other
sources for phylogenetic change and ontogenetic development. By 2021, genetic
evidence has multiplied the pathways that ultimately converge to trace the braid
of human language with human speech and signed communication (cf. Jarvis
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2019; Petkov 2020; Petkov et al. 2005). Most emphatic in the twenty-first century,
and now accepted, is that deeper-structure language and externalized surface
structure speech and sign have independently evolved and also independently
emerge throughout ontogenetic development too, their disorders and re-
mediations also being distinctly different.
Consonant with contemporary linguistic theory, MST and its derivational
character assume continuity between nature and culture. This idea likewise reso-
nates with Bateson’s “phylogenetic homology” and his signature phrase “the
pattern which connects nature and culture” (Bateson 2002 [1979]: 9).
Sebeok and Danesi provide, through their MST, a comprehensive framework
for the analysis of sign systems (2000: 14) – categorizing all types of signs, and the
relations among them, that pertain to living things.MST provides a vocabulary and
a nascent methodology for studying forms of meaning across different systems
(cosmological, biological, cultural, cognitive).
Hence, MST aims to be a comprehensive framework for systems analysis – be
the system a single text, a social habit, or a cultural system – that is, contending
with signs’ origins and levels of signification. Systems analysis investigates how
models are constructed, what their species-specific functions are, and how they
generate forms of meaning (Sebeok and Danesi 2000: 158).
According to the authors, the modeling PMS is the biologically natural ability
to model the sensory properties of objects within the Umwelt through iconic
representational forms such as iconic signs, iconic texts, iconic codes, and meta-
forms. The modeling SMS holds the potential to make reference to objects through
indexical (indicative and extensional) forms, with syntax being its key defining
feature. However, while Sebeok, like all linguists, distinguished internalized lan-
guage from externalized languaging in speech and sign, hewould not have realized
the extent to which notions about deeper-structure language are inferred, back-
engineered, from realized speech and sign. It’s now understood that externalized
languaging is saturated with both the sociocultural and the psychological; the
modeling TMS is the capacity to further extend secondary models to acquire
symbolic values, constituting cultural superstructures.
According to Sebeok and Danesi, systems analysis as performed through MST
is particularly appropriate for studying human cultures, yet it also may document
and catalogue the manifestations of all types of modeling forms across species. In
fact, in addition to linguistic expressions and social systems, MST can also be used
to grasp the nature of alloanimal models, from the iconic character of camouflage
and the indexical function of the honeybee dance to the symbolic persuasion of the
nest-decorating bowerbird mating gift.
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6 Peircean influence on MST
In the characterization of modeling systems in MST, there is a reference to the sign
types of icon–index–symbol. To contextualize this explicit reference, Sebeok and
Danesi state that the three types of modeling systems correspond grosso modo to
what Charles Peirce called firstness, secondness, and thirdness (2000: 10; also see
Danesi 2014). The nature of this correspondence between the icon–index–symbol
characterization ofmodeling systems and Peircean broad philosophical categories
is not explained any further in their 2000 book, except through the use of exam-
ples, and Danesi’s remarks in other publications (e.g. Danesi 2014).
One example is when the authors state that the child’s earliest strategy for
knowing the world through the senses is a firstness strategy (PMS). Danesi recalls
how firstness in Peirce associates with iconicity (Danesi 2014). The secondary
modeling system is the knowing strategy that urges the child to engage in exten-
sional and indexical forms of modeling (Sebeok and Danesi 2000: 10). Danesi then
(2014) explains how this strategy pertains to secondness and is the capacity to refer
to objects with extended primary forms and with indexical (indicational) forms.
The TMS allows the child to engage in symbolic forms of modeling available in its
surrounding sociocultural context, which Danesi marks as a thirdness form of
knowing. In these 2014 remarks, Danesi elucidates the relation of the different
levels of MST to Peirce’s philosophy somewhatmore thanwhat was revealed in the
original co-authored MST book.
The mapping of the modeling systems’ strategies onto Peirce’s philosophical
categories points at a correspondence across primary/icon/firstness, secondary/
index/secondness, and tertiary/symbol/thirdness. However, were this relation to
be taken as straightforward, it would not be without problems, hence probably the
reason for Sebeok and Danesi – and for us too – formulating it as a grosso modo
relation.
As an example of such issues, let’s consider how modeling systems were
characterized before their consolidation in MST. In an earlier publication, Sebeok
observes that language is a secondary modeling system by virtue of the fact that it
incorporates a syntactic component like no other in zoosemiotic systems, but that
this feature, referring to syntax, “does abound in endosemiotic systems, such as
the genetic code, the immune code, the metabolic code, and the neural code”
(1988: 58). As an ancillary note, perhaps these should not have been called
“codes,” as the flagrant use of “code” in and out of semiotics has led to a lot of
fuzzy thinking. However, Sebeok’s point here is that these systemshave grammars,
as does natural language, while culture hasn’t yet been so revealing; furthermore,
in his 1979 essay “Prefigurements of art,” Sebeok explores the aesthetic forms of
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expression of humans and alloanimals in terms of what they have in common, or
homologies. He does so by first categorizing organic forms such as kinesthetic
signs,musical signs, pictorial signs, and architectural signs as “artistic products of
averbal semiotic systems” (Sebeok 1979: 12), and thus have to be considered not as
languages as such but as forms of nonvocal–nonverbal–nonsyntactic communi-
cation. In MST terminology, these could be mapped as PMS. Sebeok was stalwart
critic of other extensions of the term, language, including that used in so-called ape
language research (cf. Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1980).
Now, were there a straightforward correspondence between Peircean cate-
gories and modeling systems, a primary form could not also be a tertiary form, or
firstness could not contain thirdness, be it artistic or cultural (although as an aside,
it is now documented that almost all mammals and also other creatures do
participate in their own cultures, if not also ours; their cultures are learned, as are
ours). That is because in a Peircean framework, thirdness includes firstness, but
not the other way round. However, in MST, PMS would include not only firstness,
but also include secondness and thirdness in some degree or capacity.
In this sense, for example, PMSwould not only be iconic but also indexical. Yet,
the chapter on the secondary modeling system (Sebeok and Danesi 2000: 82–119)
presents a range of almost exclusively linguistic examples to elucidate secondary
models, with a reliance on semiological terminology and a coming back to human
ontogenetic examples, before developing general ideas of modeling.
While ontogeny will not recapitulate phylogeny, it’s possible that, for some
purposes, taking a deeper temporal perspectivemight elucidate recurring patterns.
The same chapter also mentions a handful of examples of indexicality and sec-
ondary forms within the nonhuman animal and occurring in (nonhuman) nature,
these referred to as instances of natural indexicality (Sebeok and Danesi 2000: 96),
such as the indicational behavior of the honeyguide bird; the indexical behavior of
the flagellae of the bacterium E. coli; plants’ indexicality in orienting to the sun;
and the human immune system relying on indexical signs exchanged among cells
in order to circumscribe the self. Hence, it can also be the case that classification
cannot capture phylogeny, when the more we understand, the kinkier it will be,
with “bushes all the way down,” recalling Stephen Jay Gould and discussed above
(Gould 1987).
The explanation may go like this: the modeling systems may “fit” most
macroscopic animals, for us outside in third-person, and they can be used to “talk
about” other creatures and other scales of phenomena, such as the immune sys-
tem – and, back to pointing, the motivation may initiate in firstness, but that’s
about it. But there’s no reason that Peircean categories should fit neatly into MST
any more than the fact that in some linguïcultures, humans have a penchant for
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dividing things into threes with more conviction than using dichotomies, some-
times cheating by introducing an otherwise excluded middle!
Furthermore, looking back on Peirce as a whole, everything for him boiled
down to process, to continuities in time and contiguities in space, and overlapping
sliding scales in all of the above (Kemple 2019). Hence, forcing the modeling
systems of MST into Peircean categories as if these were stacked taxonomic cate-
gories would not necessarily move anything forward for either theory or analysis.
Most or many consumers of Peirce long for categories, labels, signs – and no
surprise, since most research is expressed in English, a hearer-oriented language
that is very noun-dominated (Durst-Andersen 2011). As an aside, wemight imagine
that were Peirce to have had almost any other language as his first language, the
systems he discerned would be otherwise expressed, unrecognizable through
translation – and not just because, by historical accident, English has a stunning
inventory of lexemes, quite a number plundered from distant lands (Nicoll 1990).
7 Analogue levels of modeling systems – on
PMS’s indexicality
Hence the three modeling systems cannot be viewed literally as levels. We
underline how the modeling systems are primarily characterized according to the
features of singularized forms. These have to do with his six general sign types,
with Peircean notions only suggestions: symptom is leaked without intention
(rheme); signal is emitted into fallow ground with or without intention (dicent);
the name is with deliberation but with or without reason assigned/attached
(legisign) – then the icon (motivated translucent relation to object in one dimen-
sion, often spatial, such as a representation in some dimension, though not
necessarily visible); and index (motivated translucent relation to object in more
than one dimension, often temporal, such as deictic trajectory); and symbol (non-
motivated, arbitrary, and opaque relation to object,fixedunto non-arbitrariness by




Icon – spa al (mo vated sign)
Index – temporal (mo vated sign)
Symbol – naturalized conven onal sign
Figure 1: Singularized forms undergirding MST with their Peircean counterparts.
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It is clear that in MST, Sebeok deliberately sought out these categorically
distinct labels of familiar receivable and interpretable signs, distinctions thatwere,
moreover, not at all either exhaustive or even umbrellaed in a single super-
category. InMST, these are paradigmatic and digital in being distinct, in contrast to
analogue, as all of Peirce’s continuous and deferred examples.
However, in Signs: An introduction to semiotics (2001a [1994]), Sebeok dis-
cusses the analogue levels of the sign in a less paradigmatic fashion than in MST.
In this text, Sebeok makes the fundamental point that the six-type sign classifi-
cation (later proposed in MST) refers to aspects, or levels, of the signs, rather than
fixed types. Sebeok echoes Eco’s affirmation that “it is not signs that are actually
being classified, but more precisely, aspects of signs: in other words, a given sign
may […] exhibit more than one aspect, so that one must recognize differences in
gradation” (Eco 1972, cited in Sebeok 2001a: 43).With this acknowledgment comes
what is to us an important clue concerning the fuzziness of MST’s basic premises:
that the three modeling systems – PMS, SMS, TMS – cannot be viewed literally as
levels or as related in any systematic or seemingly mechanical fashion, but as
analogue levels of the sign.
Indeed, in discussing the notion of “indexicality,” Sebeok acknowledges that
[…] this Peircean category, like every other, cannot be well understood piecemeal, without
taking into account, at much the same time, the veritable cascade of other irreducible triadic
relational structures which make up the armature of Peirce’s semiotic – indeed, without
coming to terms with his philosophy in its entirety. (Sebeok 2001a: 84)
Hence, if one acknowledges Peirce’s influence on the six sign types described in
MST, these are not to be taken as fully paradigmatic, self-contained entities, but
as analogue categories that overlap and cooperate with other sign categories. In a
true Peircean fashion, opposition and competition among sign types is not fully
realizable. Sebeok recalls how iconicity and indexicality have often been
polarized, “although never by Peirce” (2001a: 88). Despite Peirce once stating
“uncommonly loosely” that a sign “is either an icon, an index, or a symbol,” he
soon realized that the utility of his trichotomy was greatly enhanced by
recognizing that it is not signs but rather aspects of signs that are being classified
(cited in Sebeok 2001a: 90). Furthermore, in addition to acknowledging that the
six general categories refer to aspects of the sign, there is indeed a hierarchic
principle inherent in the architecture of any species of sign, since “the sign is
legitimately, if loosely, labelled after the aspect that ranks predominant” (Sebeok
2001a: 44).
Much as in Eco’s limits of interpretation, circumstances or context influence the
aspect or level of the sign that can be ranked as predominant, since “a given object
can, depending on the circumstance in which it is displayed,momentarily function,
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to a degree, in the role of an icon, an index, or a symbol” (Sebeok 2001a: 89) – or
symptoms, signals, name, to add the remainder of the categoriesmentioned inMST.
Hence, the primary, secondary, tertiary modeling systems, being loosely based on
analogue sign levels – including but not exclusively, iconic, indexical, and symbol
aspects – appear to be not strictly paradigmatic but quasi-paradigmatic. To come
back to the earlier issue, the recognition of this feature ofMST’s categories, allows us
to understand why the primary modeling system harbors indexicality in addition to
iconicity. Furthermore, for Sebeok all externalized signs necessarily partake of
secondness, in other words, they contain an indexical level, although this aspect is
prominently upgraded only in certain contexts (Sebeok 2001a: 90). Sebeok states
how signswith indexical function occur at a cellular level as entitieswhich can issue
instructions for their embedding organism in the manner of an index (2001a: 91).
Positing indexicality within a phylogenetic fashion, Sebeok reminds us how “the
indexical relationof secondness– alongwith its elder andyounger siblings,firstness
and thirdness – appeared in terrestrial evolution of life forms about 3.6 × 109 years
ago” (Sebeok 2001a: 90).
What this turning to functions and interpretants leads us to conclude is that
the primary modeling system can be both iconic and indexical, despite its defi-
nition inMST as “the innate category for simulativemodeling” (Sebeok andDanesi
2000: 44). This category is only foregrounding the iconic aspect of primary forms,
rather than exclusively categorizing it as such. Hence, as a form of modeling
evincing some survival function, PMS is the repository of action-triggers or reagent
signs, and as such has a strong indexical-indicative component that pertains, in
Peirce’s terms, to secondness.
8 Systems thinking influence on MST
But it isn’t the Peircean heritage alone that allowed Sebeok to conjure modeling
systems in an analogue fashion. It was also his systems thinking imprint. He
testified to his long interest in systems thinking in a 1977 essay:
The kinship of semiotically based programmes […] to the movement known as General
System Theory (Bertalanffy 1968), or GST, is seldom underlined yet their common
denominator is rather obvious. As a ‘natural philosophy’, both these variants of a single
metatheory can be traced back to Leibniz […] and his programme for amathesis universalis.
(Sebeok 1977: 185)
In this context of cosmological, biological, and cultural modeling, analogue
models, and relative analogue levels, are a necessity. Analogue refers to the fact
that the system or form is fuzzy from the outside, for the observer. From the inside
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there may be many descriptions but the actual processes will be so unknown,
multiple, and even contradictory as and until they might self-organize. From the
outside, especially for a naïve observer or analyst, the system and its constituents
can be both general and vague, this also illustrating the human reliance on met-
aphors from sight, our privileged sense. In general quotidian terms, human in-
dividuals, and human groups, will necessarily have simplified models of their
“others,” basically reflecting their inevitable and manifold ignorance.
Systems thinking recognizes and even builds on the analogue–digital
distinction, with or without the counterbalance of the third elicited by Peircean
semiotics. Before devoting himself full-time to semiotics, and wandering away
from linguistics (cf. Cobley 2003), Sebeok’s passion for bringing minds together
placed him in conjunction with similar transdisciplinarians in general systems
theory. One of his most significant events, held at Indiana University, was that in
1962 devoted to an inquiry about paralinguistics and kinesics. In this phenomenal
congregation, Margaret Mead tipped the balance in determining how, in English-
speaking North America at least, semioticswould indeed be called semiotics. Mead
and other players, some co-editors of the 1964 transactions, were also foundational
in the establishment of general systems theory (cf. Sebeok et al. 1964). This con-
ference forced these semioticians and systems thinkers to integrate the outer
realms of human languaging, bringing in extensions of language-qua-language in
embodiedmeaning-makingwithin the context andwith themovement of the body,
now recognized as the specialized fields of study paralinguistics and kinesics.
While systems thinking is less confrontational than the assertion of systems
theory, in the West at least, these two natural allies have not to date joined forces.
Ambitious, holistic approaches in semiotics alone include the Society for the
Advancement of General Systems Theory in 1954, involving both Gregory Bateson
and Margaret Mead, which organization in 1988 ratcheted up to the International
Society for the Systems Sciences, in which few card-carrying semioticians still
participate.
To trace how systems thinking arrived in semiotics through MST, one can look
even further back at a broader historical-political context. Waldstein (2008) ex-
plains how in the 1940s, Soviet academia (the repository for early Tartu–Moscow
semiotics) was strongly influenced by cybernetics in light of the appeal of ideo-
logical neutrality and the systematic exactness which it embraced. This seemed to
perfectly suit the needs of an academic environment which was frustrated by the
state’s and the Party’s infringements on the personal and corporate autonomy of
academics and academia, and hence was pervaded by a wariness of overtly po-
litical projects. In fact, in 1964 the term “secondary modeling system” (notably,
“modeling” is a mathematical term) was used as a euphemism for semiotics
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because the very term “semiotics” was prohibited by scientific state officials
(Chernov 1988: 12).
Hence the “alliance” of Soviet academia with cybernetics can be seen as the
beginning of a process of de-Stalinization of knowledge, later dubbed as Euro-
communism, or “the vast process of change involving the left everywhere in the
world” (Ross 1980: 15). This aligns with a political formation that sets out to
transcend the failures of the past through involvement in political struggles that
take place within institutions and a principled support of social and political
pluralism (Boggs and Plotke 1980: 7). It is in this context of striving for pluralism
which academics in Soviet times were trying to achieve that systems thinking,
through modeling, also surfaces as semiotics.
Coming back to the continuity between PMSand SMS, this can be seen through
a systems-thinking lens in the following way. In terms of the evolutionary emer-
gence and the ontogenetic development of meaning-making, paralinguistics and
kinesics turn out to be foundational, arising from PMS. Once emerged and
established, paralinguistics and kinesics can both support (dialectically) and/or
fuse with syntactic forms in SMS like languaging, as well as become independent
singular forms in TMS.
Hence, conceptually the PMSmay be based in impedance-matching, often in a
sensorial realm, to be used as is, perhaps limited to those internalized functions
that have sometimes been called codes despite their syntactic functions, such as
the genetic, the immune, the metabolic, the neural, the histone, the epigenetic, the
virome, sharing syntactic structures and functions with the verbality in the SMS.
Some functions of PMS may carry over into the secondary modeling system once
there is any externalization with a significant surround, that being somewhat
complementary and iconic or in incipient firstness. But in actualization of any
processes, those processes will be by definition in secondness.
9 Pandemic’s dance among themodeling systems
As so evident in the nuances and probes around MST, Sebeok’s sovereignty in
semiotics in no way reflects his adopting or developing any singular theoretical
paradigm. With respect to ideas in general, he was a gourmand rather than a
gourmet, always keeping himself open to surprise, never consolidating his for-
mulations into stiff, consistent definitions or models. This reflects his broad
background as well as his idiosyncratic habits. Upon his retirement from Indiana
University in 1991, Sebeok proved himself, naturally, irreplaceable.
While Sebeok and his ever-expanding interests attracted followers from every
age grade and profession, there would be no Sebeokian school. Perhaps this
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reflects the incredible breadth, depth, and variety of his pursuits, which evaded
any Procrustean force that might lend consistency and coherence to a single
paradigm. At the same time, while there is no school, all semioticians find them-
selves recurringly entangled with Sebeok’s incommensurable passions, from MST
to Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt and Innenwelt to James Lovelock’s Gaia Hypoth-
esis. Often, what Sebeok continually pulls closer for semiotic attention turns out to
be the biological, often the lesser-recognized PMS, and the problematizing of
boundaries within and beyond both culture and biology.
MST allows a play between composite rather than prismatic modeling sys-
tems: a more primary though not purely iconic modeling system, a somewhat
secondary without strictly indexical modeling system, and a tertiary surely
symbolic modeling system for everything else. Once Sebeok brought biological
processes into the PMS, some distinctions between the ensuing and presumed
three levels of the modeling systems dissolved. The clarity of Sebeok’s PMS,
infused with what now seems obvious, given biological evolution, actually
troubles both the SMS and TMS, in part because it is increasingly clear that there
will be no clear-cut boundary between the biological, or nature, and the socio-
culturolinguistic, or nurture.
In the case of Umwelt and Innenwelt, Sebeok’s attention was drawn to the
dynamics of sensation and perception, perhaps en route to cognition. With
Umwelt, the unit of analysis may be either individual or species, referring to the
German loanword labeling an abstract and non-reciprocal significant surround of
a creature. Innenwelt pertains to the individual, but again, of an animal. Neither
Umwelt nor Innenwelt will satisfactorily model the relations of living things in
kingdoms other than Animalia. One can imagine that Sebeok would eventually
resolve this conceptual missing link.
The Gaia Hypothesis posits that the earth, our geologic substrate, is also a
living organism. Sebeok was attracted to the strength of Lovelock’s metaphor, or
perhaps also a simile, because it brought biology into play on our planet regardless
of any human inhabitants (cf. Lovelock 1979). Biological process will never be
totally described by entropy; living things infect the inert, and render the new
whole into a far-from-equilibrium dynamical system, much as with King Midas’s
touch. This of course, echoes Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003), whom Sebeok followed
even though the Russian–Belgian was a physical chemist, and not a biologist
(cf. Prigogine and Stengers 1984 [1977]). Sebeok was successful in drawing
mathematician René Thom into his semiotic web, however (cf. Thom 1990), as well
as Robert Rosen in biophysics (2012 [1985]).
Another biologist and systems thinker, G. EvelynHutchinson, was asked in his
final year what then, in 1991, was a major gap in scientific theory. He replied
without hesitation: “insides and outsides,” hence, boundaries realized in relations
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of containments and connections (Anderson 2000). Hutchinson’s insight points to
the most semiosic element in all of biology: the membrane. Being both transitive
and intransitive, the membrane allows, more than directs, the disparate violations
of itself through activities that, in themselves, define the boundary; the membrane
may constitute a grammar in itself.
Molecular biologist Hoffmeyer, coming to biological understanding of semi-
otics from a parallel yet converging trajectory as Sebeok, recognized that bound-
aries, skins, membranes, or “surfaces within surfaces” (2008) are essentially
constitutive of the biological self, and that themembrane’s function of negotiating
an external environment for the benefit of the collective is essentially a semiotic
capacity (2008: 25, 28). “If any agency in the body deserves to be called directive or
controlling, it would not be the DNA but instead the membranes that permeate the
body” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 31).
The blood–brain barrier has been a quintessential paradigm of biological
modeling, whereby the brainwould be blocked from infectious agents, toxins, and
antibodies carried by blood, while the blood would also be free of backsplash from
disorders in the central nervous system. Yet it turns out that some analogue
permeability may be both regular and modulated by everything from mood to
exercise to nutritional state to gut microbiota. That is, the barrier is less efficient
with negative moods, inert behavior, poor health, and less diverse microbiome
(cf. Abbott 2020).
With the twenty-first century’s pandemic, everyone regardless of background
finds themselves aware of membranes of the virus, the metaphoric membrane
allowing or preventing contagion, the membrane of the social fabric that can grow
herd immunity. The virus has reintroduced us to ourselves, as well. No one has
doubted that our species is saturated in sociality, but the extent towhich the PMS is
predicated on the sensual presence of others, or other creatures, has never been so
clear (cf. Field 2003 [2001]; Guerro et al. 2017 [2001]). Over the last year and half,
substituting in-person office meetings with videocalls has not quite been the
same – worse for some, better for others – yet undoubtedly at the same time both
unsatisfactory and harboring new communicational opportunities. The physical-
unto-social distancing represents, and often actually creates, a conflict of physical
onto social membranes – as an extreme point in case, think about the shootings
that have happened across the world due to people disregarding or overly
regarding distancing, with or without face masks.
With its biological overtone, PMS and its manifestation in proxemics is the
primary grounding for social distancing. But considering the analogue levels of
MST, social distancing is an institutional intervention in twenty-first century hu-
man communication habits that builds on all three modeling systems. It interferes
with human’s phylogenetic and adaptive proxemic habits and prescribes an
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ontogenetic, exaptive one – one meter apart (if not two) from another human
being. Making the point for us, Fleming and Slotta (2020) sensibly warn us to be
careful not to oversimplify and just physicalize the act of “social distancing,”
ignoring the elaborate cultural frameworks and discursive mediations that un-
derpin this avoidance register, in other words, ignoring the SMS and TMS layers of
social distancing. Social distancing complicates phylogenesis and ontogenesis,
intervenes within a very short time-span on adaptative yet not purely functional
communicational behavior. As Cobley once put it, this was exactly the kind of
thing that Edward T. Hall was predicting in his 1959 book, The silent language – not
the virus, of course, but a potential crisis articulating proximity and distance. It
should definitely bring semiotics and communications studies, and especially
modeling systems theorywith its composite, analogue, non-paradigmatic semiotic
modeling systems, to the forefront of research.
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